Theoretical model

23
In this section, we first present a general framework for analysing the effects of policies In the table, Gi = ∂G/∂si, and Hi = ∂H/∂si, for i = 1, 2, and * and * represent the marginal 9 social benefits (costs) of loosening (tightening) the SMSs g and h. Since both G and H are 10 public goods, they increase social welfare: W G´ > 0, W H´ > 0. Because by conditions (5b) and
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(6b) the Lagrangian multipliers must be nonnegative, we conclude that the terms 12 and are both positive. From (3c) and (4c), if W1 M < 13 0, G1 < 0, and H1 < 0 for all s, then the solution to the maximization problem is to set the 14 levels of both instruments at zero: s1 * = s2 * = 0. The intuition is that if raising the level of 15 instrument s1 always lowers market-based welfare and always lowers the levels of the public 16 goods, then there is no reason to use the policy instruments-raising their values makes and always raises the levels to the public goods, then (3c) and (4c) imply that higher values of 2 the policy instrument are always better, and so there is no solution to the maximization 3 problem. For the problem at hand to be interesting, therefore, there must be values of the 4 policy instruments at which raising their levels leads to both benefits in some parts of the 5 economy and losses in other parts. Given that the conditions hold that result in an interior 6 solution to the maximization problem, conditions (3c) -(6c) imply a system of identities: 7
,
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For notational brevity, let 9 (8)
10
Differentiating (8) with respect to g and putting the results into matrix form, we get, 11
12 From (9) it can be shown that
13
(10) 
Furthermore, assume that the marginal deadweight from using si increases as its level of use triangles get bigger at a "faster" rate as use of the instrument rises). Also assume that 12 marginal production of public goods is falling in the use of the instruments, Gii < 0 and Hii < 13 0 for i = 1, 2. Under these conditions, the definition in (8) implies that Wii < 0 for i = 1, 2.
14 Assume also that the cross derivatives are positive: Gij > 0, Hij > 0, and Wij M > 0 for i ≠ j.
15
Then increased use of si increases the marginal return of sj in the creation of public goods, 16 and lowers the market-derived deadweight loss from a marginal increase in sj. used, jointly some other public good G is produced according to the relationship G = .
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In our example, this public good might be "food security", which will be further discussed in Producer surplus in market a is lowered by the shaded area ∆PSa. Taxpayers save the thick- area Y plus the shaded area Z. In market b, taxpayers save ∆TSb, which is equal to area Z.
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The welfare of suppliers of input b does not change since the producer price stays constant at 11 pb s0 . In sum, the rise in aggregate welfare is the cross-hatched trapezoid, approximately equal inputs. In either market, deadweight is incurred when a marginal unit of the input is produced 10 at a marginal cost greater than the marginal benefit of its demand. The difference between the 11 heights of the supply and demand curves in this market at that particular quantity of the good 12 is the marginal social deadweight from the production and consumption of the inputs. For 13 example, the more of good b is required by the SMS, the lower will be the marginal benefit of
Model overview
13
Jordmod is a price-endogenous, spatial, comparative-static, and partial equilibrium model for (BFJ, div.) and farm account statistics (NILF, div.).
3
The food industry optimization models minimize total industry costs subject to volume 4 and regional distribution of raw commodities, transport costs between farms and plants, and 5 processing costs at the plants. Models are set up for the dairy industry and the meat industry. chain. Except for the cases of dairy products and meat, fixed processing margins are applied 10 for final demand.
11
The market module consists of 41 final markets. The supply part of the final markets such as import tariffs, import quotas and export subsidies.
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As will be explained below, The availability of each nutrient  {e, p, f} for consumption in a crisis is,
where is the per-unit potential provision of nutrient from activity i = 1, …, I, and 6 is the current level of activity i. and is the provision of nutrient from 7 seafood and grain stocks, respectively. Norwegian agrobiodiversity has weakened, both quantitatively in terms losses in Rønningen, 1999). Table 2 reports how we quantify the state of biodiversity using two 
SMS for GHG emissions
19
The Norwegian agricultural sector is responsible for twelve percent of the national GHG agriculture could come at a negative social cost. The government could simply reduce its 7 subsidies, and the overall result would be lower national GHG emissions and a more efficient 8 economy.
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In order to avoid emissions leakages and achieve complete internalization of a potential 
Scenarios examined in Jordmod
5
The baseline is constructed as a continuation of current policies (i.e., subsidies, milk quotas 
Selected results
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This section presents the simulation results of the modelling exercise. First, we report the 21 levels of the public goods and bads under the different policy scenarios, paying particular 22 attention to which SMSs bind and which do not. We then present the corresponding shadow 23 prices and discuss these in the light of the results from the theoretical model. We discuss how 1 the simultaneous satisfaction of the SMSs of food security and agrobiodiversity affects GHG 2 emissions from domestic production and imports. Finally, we examine how the various parts 3 of the agricultural sector adapt to the imposition of SMSs, and the implications for production 4 and social welfare.
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In table 3 we report the values of the indicators for food security, agrobiodiversity and Finally, GHG emissions increase to over thirty percent above the level of the SMS (1.31 in 13   table 3 ). These results imply that if satisfying the SMSs is a main purpose of the Norwegian 14 government's intervention in agriculture, policies are clearly misspecified.
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In all six scenarios, GHG emissions fall from the baseline value of 1.31. Under the carbon 16 cap, the SMS is not binding, and the emissions tax proves to be higher than necessary to 17 achieve the reduction requirement. The required GHG emissions reductions are hence not in The relationship between food security and agrobiodiversity is more complex and The theoretical model in section 3 showed that balancing public goods in agriculture 10 involves complex trade-offs, and the simulations confirm this result. 
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Let parameter g change its value from g´ to g´ -∆g. Let a path of integration L be defined as 
10
Because h remains at h´, the quantity supplied of b is constant at b´ in all the equlibria.
11
Therefore we may write, 
